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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
TONY PECHARICH, 
Applicant and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, and INDE-
PENDENT COAL AND 
COKE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 6242 
Brief of Respondents 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondents will not attempt in this matter to 
make a statement of facts as such. Such a statement 
would result merely in duplication, inasmuch as the 
argument will consist almost solely of a summation 
of evidence. However, Respondents enter their pro-
test again Appellant's alleged statement of facts being 
considered by the Court as such, and insist that it is 
nothing more nor less than a summary of certain parts 
of Appellant's case or evidence. 
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Seldom, if ever, have counsel for Respondents been 
before this Court on a matter wherein questions of law 
played so minor a part. The Industrial Commission 
had presented to it but one question of fact, namely: 
did the claimant's evidence show that his disability 
resulted from or was contributed to by his accident, or 
did Defendant's evidence show that there was no causal 
connection~ The Commission found the latter, and 
under well established rules of law this Court is inter-
ested only in the question of whether or not such 
decision finds its support in competent evidence. 
In attempting to avoid this limitation of the prob-
lem Appellant argues that medical opinion supporting 
Respondent Company's position may not be considered 
sufficient to overcome lay testimony as to the actual 
physiological effect of his injury. In other words, he 
claims that he was a well, strong man before the injury 
and that he suffered increasing disability following its 
date and that no amount of opinion evidence can over-
come the necessary inferences from this fact. We 
answer the contention by waiving it, as we may prop-
erly do because Appellant argues from a premise not 
established by the record. The record contains definite 
competent evidence that claimant's condition was not 
that of a well man before the accident, and that there 
was no acceleration toward disability thereafter. Hence, 
the Commission was still confronted with the stated 
question, which it resolved, upon conflicting evidence, 
in favor of the employer. We conceive it our duty and 
substantially our sole duty to point out to this Court as 
concisely as possible the evidence. in the record support-
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ing the Commission's conclusion that Appellant's admit-
ted disability has no causal connection with his admitted 
accident. 
ARGUMENT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DECISION SUP-
PORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
Appellant entered the employ of Respondent Com-
pany on or about October 15, 1936, (Defendants' Exhi-
bit "E") being a little less than ten months prior to 
the accident in question, which occurred August 6, 1937. 
According to the mine foreman, George B. Jackson, it 
soon became apparent that he was unable to properly 
perform his work. The foreman thought at first it was 
because he was lazy, but found out afterwards that he 
was simply unable to do the job. This was apparent 
from the time he started to work until he was finally 
laid off about February 1, 1938. He was losing weight 
and this inability to perform his work was gradually 
becoming more pronounced, but significantly this decline 
and inability was no more marked or accelerated follow-
ing the accident than before. (Tr. 60-3) (Method of 
Transcript reference same as Appellant's.) Apparently 
loss of weight had made itself evident even before claim-
ant commenced work for Defendant Company. He tes-
tified that his normal weight was one hundred fifty 
pounds and upward. (2nd Tr. 33-4) Yet his employ-
ment card shows this weight as one hundred forty pounds 
at the time he came with the Defendant Company. 
(Defendants' Exhibit "E ") 
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James Collins, a driver at the mine, formerly a face 
man, likewise testified as to claimant's existing dis-
ability prior to the accident. He walked slowly and with 
a limp and would leave his place of work earlier than 
the rest of the men in order to reach the man trip by 
the time they arrived. This condition existed before 
the accident, as well as after, and the witness could 
notice no difference in this respect. The shovel run-
ners complained of his work and claimant himself 
complained of his inability to travel with much of a 
load. ( 3rd Tr. 53-58) In the face of this very definite 
and positive testimony by men in a position to know 
whereof they spoke, Appellant goes far in stating, as he 
does in his brief, that before the accident he "was an 
able-bodied and strong man.'' 
Since Appellant's disability is admittedly caused 
by chronic hypertrophic arthritis of the spine, the testi-
mony of these lay witnesses, showing a pre-existing and 
gradually developing disability, becomes most signifi-
cant and it becomes even more significant when we 
examine the nature of his accident and resultant injury 
in the light of the medical testimony. As stated in his 
brief, claimant fell backward and struck his back on a 
rail. He received what Dr. Robinson described as a 
slight bruise or contusion. ( Tr. 40 and 45) He returned 
to work at the end of a week, that is, August 13, 1937, 
and continued in his employment until early in Febru-
ary, 1938, when he was laid off by reason of slackening 
work and was not thereafter re-employed. (2nd Tr. 37) 
It is interesting to note how uniformly the doctors 
testifying in this case agreed that such an injury would 
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not, and even rould not, cause, light up, or accelerate 
an arthritic condition of the spine such as afflicted 
claimant. This is the opinion of the Company doctors, 
Dr. Robinson (Tr. -!1-2), Dr. Lindem (3rd Tr. 34, 37), 
the claimant's 0"\\"'11 family physirian, Dr. Hubbard (Tr. 
72, 79-81) and Doctors Richards and Tyree, (3rd Tr. 5, 
7a, 8, 9, 17, 19, 20) appointed by the Commission to 
make an examination and report on its behalf at the 
request of attorneys representing the interested parties. 
The only doctor who thought the accident acceler-
ated the disease was Dr. Demman. (Tr. 89) He based 
his opinion on a hypothetical question which included 
the statement that claimant was healthy prior to the 
accident and he stated that the only way he could con-
nect the condition with the injury was through the his-
tory of the case given him by claimant, (Tr. 90) which, 
it must be recalled, was a year and eight months after 
the accident. (Tr. 87) Significantly, Dr. Demman stated 
that whether the injury was of a mild or severe nature 
would affect his conclusion in this matter. (Tr. 92-3) 
We say significantly because testimony of the Commis-
sion's examining physician, Dr. Richards, shows most 
clearly circumstances under which trauma may or may 
not cause or accelerate osteoarthritis. 
It is most difficult to pick out portions of Dr. Rich-
ards' testimony and thereby obtain the entire picture 
essential to an understanding of his conclusion in this 
matter. His statements and explanations, especially on 
cross-examination, are most enlightening. In brief, he 
states that this type of arthritis is slow in progress and 
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that claimant's case had undoubtedly been of some years 
standing with a gradual and constantly increasing dis-
ability. (3rd Tr. 9, 16) In order to charge an accident 
with an arthritic condition the accident must not only 
be of a severe or fracturing type, but it must directly 
injure the bony structure in which the arthritis develops. 
(3rd Tr. 10-12) This prerequisite he states is not found 
in the instant case, first, because the trauma was not 
severe and second, because the afflicted portion of claim-
ant's spine, the forward or anterior, is one of the best 
protected portions of the body's bony structure, difficult 
of injury except by very severe trauma, of which injury 
there was here no evidence. (3rd Tr. 10, 11, 15). 
Although Doctors Richards and Tyree were, upon 
stipulation of the parties, appointed by the Commission 
as its own examining physicians, Appellant attacks their 
findings on the basis that Dr. Richards is not an ortho-
pedic surgeon. While he may not claim this as his spe-
cialty, he states: "Well, we have had in the office, the 
last time I looked up the figures, fourteen hundred forty 
cases of arthritis. I have seen quite a number of them 
since.'' Of this large number of cases he estimates 
that one-fourth involved the spine. (3rd Tr. 29) In 
view of this experience and earlier spine work as a 
bone specialist, Dr. Richards' qualifications and th~ 
weight to which his opinion is entitled seem rather def-
initely established. (3rd Tr. 11-12) Unfortunately, Dr. 
Tyree was out of town and therefore unavailable at the 
time of the final hearing. (3rd Tr. 29) But Dr. Richards 
testified "Dr. Tyree went over the case with me in detail, 
and agreed with everything that was said. He read the 
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letter and said he agreed with me 100%." (3rd Tr. 17) 
Since the Commission was requested to appoint for this 
examination an orthopedic surgeon, we may, without 
doing violence to the record, assume that Dr. Tyree 
was such. 
Dr. Hubbard, who was the first doctor consulted by 
Appellant, following the termination of his employment 
with Respondent Company, testified at length as to 
Appellant's general condition, chargeable to and cen-
tering in arthritis of septic or toxic origin. (Tr. 72-4} 
It was some months after this consultation before he 
ever mentioned to Dr. Hubbard that he had received any 
sort of injury. (Tr. 71) Dr. Hubbard likewise clearly 
shows that this type of injury could have no causal con-
nection with Appellant's condition. (Tr. 81) 
The two chiropractors called by claimant testified 
that in their opinion there was causal connection be-
tween the claimant's disability and his accident. Other 
than the fact that this presents a conflict, we merely 
observe that according to these men arthritis is always 
the result of trauma and claimant's condition must have 
been caused by this or some other accident. Since they 
knew of no other accident they charged it to this. (Tr. 
59; 3rd Tr. 48, 50) With their school of thought on this 
subject the Commission apparently did not agree. 
It would appear significant that while Appellant 
testifies that his disability commenced in February, 1938, 
when his employment with Respondent Company ceased, 
he made no claim to the Commission or otherwise until 
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May, 1939, a year and three months later. It must also 
be kept in mind that Appellant continued in the same 
employment for six months after the accident and at 
the same job and pay. (Tr. 15) His explanation for 
delay in making claim is that he thought that he had 
rheumatism. With that we can not quarrel, and he 
probably still thinks the same, or at least should, since 
every doctor and chiropractor who testified stated that 
was and is his trouble. Hence, his change of attitude 
must be otherwise accounted for. Obviously someone 
suggested to him that the disability might be connected 
with an injury suffered by him back in August, 1937. 
In order to make a causal connection seem in the least 
plausible, it appeared imperative that the accident in 
question must have been of some substantial severity. 
Appellant testified that he was knocked unconscious, 
that the man working near him, Jimmy Collins, revived 
him, and that the mine foreman, George Jackson, assist-
ed him out of the mine. (Tr. 9-10) This story is posi-
tively contradicted by both Collins and Jackson. Collins 
testified that he did not even know Pecharich had suf-
fered an accident until he came back to where Pecharich 
had been working, asked the shovel runner where the 
track man was and was informed that he got hurt and 
went home. (3rd Tr. 55, 58-9, 61-2) Jackson testified 
as follows: 
''A. All I know about it was, several 
days after he had been - after he was off 
- that they said he had fell or hurt him-
self. I didn't know it until I had to make 
out the report, the accident report. 
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Q. Did you have anything to do with 
getting him out of the mine or getting him 
to the doctor, or anything to do with him at 
the time of the accident~ 
A. No sir. I think he walked up. 
Q. Did he ever report to you at any 
time that he was having any difficulty as a 
result of the accident, after he went back to 
work? 
A. No sir." (Tr. 63) 
Dr. Robinson said that as he recalled, Appellant had 
stated to him that the accident happened about eleven 
o'clock A. M., that he stopped work about an hour and 
a half later and then came out of the mine. (Tr. 38) 
The foregoing discussion of the evidence has been 
largely confined to Respondents' case with the empha-
sis in relation to medical testimony on that of the non· 
Company doctors, since they cannot be charged with 
testifying in behalf or for the benefit of an employer. 
With conflicts this Court is not concerned, as it has 
stated in more than fifty of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion cases decided by it. We cite only two, one early, 
one late, to the effect that this Court can neither weigh 
nor review substantial competent evidence supporting 
findings of the Industrial Commission, since the Com-
missioners are the sole judges of the credibility of wit-
nesses and weight of evidence. 
Reteuna v. Ind. Com. 185 P. 535 
55 Utah 258 
Leventis v. Ind. Com. 35 P. (2d) 770 
84 Utah 174 
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In fact, this Court has said that it may not in 
compensation cases direct what inference shall be drawn 
from the evidence, even when there is no conflict. 
Parker v. Ind. Com. 5 P. (2d) 573 
78 Utah 509 
Appellant's brief has cited a number of cases which 
are in point only because they involve disability caused 
by arthritis, that is, in point because they deal with 
the same systemic disorder. The books are full of such 
cases. In fact the American Digest system devotes Sec-
tion 1525 of its Workmen's Compensation topic entirely 
to such cases. Naturally these cases encompass various 
phases of legal learning applicable to arthritic disability, 
but there is no rule of law to be gleaned from them in 
any wise helpful to Appellant's position. The only Utah 
case is one in which this Court determines that the evi-
dence is insufficient to support findings of the Indus-
trial Commission that claimant was suffering from sac-
roiliac arthritis, resulting from accidental injury. 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ind. Com. 
278 P. 60, 74 Utah 170 
For what it may be worth, we cite two of the cases 
from other jurisdictions. They have some value because 
they come from stat-es in which, as in this, the findings 
of the Commission may not be questioned if supported 
by competent evidence. In the case of 
Duchant v. Oliver Iron Mng. Co. 
256 N. W. (Minn.) 905 
the Court says, quoting from the syllabus: 
''Evidence that employee's disability 
was due to progress of arthritic condition 
10 
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of back and not to accident supported In-
dustrial Commission's finding that em-
ployee was not entitled to compensation.'' 
In the case of 
Jackson v. Iowa Telephone Co., 179 N. W. 
(Iowa) 849, at page 851 
the court says : 
''We said in the Hanson case, supra, 
at page 824 of 176 N. W. that there was 
'some evidence sustaining the Industrial 
Commissioner's conclusion that the disease 
was lighted up or accelerated by the acci-
dental slipping of the hammer from the 
chisel and striking complainant. * * * 
This being true, the courts may not inter-
fere with such finding,' citing the Griffith 
case. Such is the situation here, except 
that the commissioner arrived at the oppo-
site conclusion. The rule ought to be, and 
is, the same in either event. Any other rule 
would encourage litigants to bring the mat-
ter first before the arbitration committee, 
then to the Industrial Commissioner, then 
to the district court, then to the Supreme 
Court, for the determination of the credi-
bility of the witnesses and the preponder-
ance of the evidence, hoping that some-
where along the line a tribun~l could he 
found that would differ, as the district 
court did, with the findings of the commit-
tee and commissioner, the tribunals estab-
lished by law for the determination of such 
questions ; so that instead of simplifying 
the procedure, and lessening litigation and 
expense, it would become more complicated 
and more expensive.'' 
Appellant's brief rather specializes on Washington 
and Louisiana cases. These are in no sense helpful 
11 
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since they are based on statutes entirely different from 
our own. As the Washington Court says in the case of 
Johnston v. Dept. of Labor and Industries 
2 P. (2d) 67 
quoting from the syllabus: 
"On appeal to court from compensa-
tion award, court may determine questions 
of fact and modify or reverse award, in 
accordance with findings (Rem. Com. Stat. 
Supp. 1927, Sec. 7697)." 
In Louisiana trial is by the court, not by Commis-
sion, and the Louisiana court says that the trial judge's 
conclusion in employer's liability case will be accepted 
where the evidence is evenly divided. 
Baugh v. Scotland Lumber Co. 
5 La. App. 348 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY HOLD HEARING 
BY REFEREE 
Appellant attacks the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion to appoint and conduct its hearing by referee. At 
the outset we remark that Appellant is now violating 
the well known rule of law prohibiting the raising on 
appeal of questions not presented below. In the case of 
U jevich v. Inspiration Cons. Copper 
Co., 33 P. (2d) 599, 
the Arizona court says, quoting from the syllabus: 
''Objection for first time on appeal 
that Industrial Commission, after remand 
of case by Supreme Court, did not have a 
12 
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formal hearing to determine matters re-
quired by mandate, held too late.'' 
To the same effect we cite : 
Benton ]fining Co. v. Ind. Com. 
151 N. E. (Ill.) 520 
Schaefer v. Lowell-K rekeler Co. 
49 S. W. (2d) (Mo.) 209 
Utah does not seem to have passed upon this ques-
tion in connection with Industrial Commission cases, 
but it is, of course, elementary as a principle applicable 
to appeals. 
Malstrom v. Lund, 185 P. 1109, 
55 Utah 353 
Summit County v. Gustaveson, 
54 P. 977, 18 Utah 351 
Even the Utah Statute seems to contemplate that all 
questions shall be presented first to the Commission. 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 42-1-24 
The question of the right of the Commission to 
use examiners or referee was definitely passed on by 
this Court in the case of 
Utah Copper Co. v. Ind. Com. 
193 P. 24, 57 Utah 118 
Certain sections of the statute referred to in the above 
case have been slightly modified but are still substan-
tially the same. Compiled laws of Utah, 1917, Section 
3100, and Laws of Utah, 1919, Section 3099 are now com-
bined in Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 as Section 42-2-5, 
13 
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which was in tnrn amended in Laws of Utah 1939, at 
page 74. The Court, in the above case, also refers to 
Section 3149, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, which is 
now embodied in the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
Section 42-1-82. 
It might also be well to keep in mind that this mat-
ter comes before this Court on certiorari and the scope 
of review must be considered. In the case of 
Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609 
31 Utah 473, 
the Court says, quoting from the syllabus : 
''While, on certiorari to review a judg-
ment, the question of the judge's right to 
hold the office, whether by reason of the in-
validity of the law under which he was 
chosen or appointed, or because of his want 
of the proper qualifications, cannot be con-
sidered, the question whether the law under 
which he acts, and on which the validity of 
his acts depends, is unconstitutional may 
be considered.'' 
Appellant's brief gave to this question summary t_reat-
ment and we believe it has been sufficiently covered 
herein. 
In conclusion we submit that the. decision of the 
Commission is amply supported by the record. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY, 
Attorneys for Respondents . . 
14 
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